Modal Logic is traditionally concerned with the intensional operators \possibly" and \necessary", whose intuitive correspondence with the standard quanti ers \there exists" and \for all" comes out clearly in the usual Kripke semantics. This observation underlies the well-known translation from modal logic into the rst-order language over possible worlds models 12, 13]. In this way, modal formalisms correspond to fragments of a full rst-order (or sometimes higher-order) language over these models, which are both expressively perspicuous and deductively tractable. In this paper, we shall enquire which features of`modal fragments' are responsible for these attractions. Throughout, we shall concentrate on the basic language of modal propositional logic, which still serves as the`pure paradigm' in a rapidly expanding eld of more expressive modal formalisms 56, 51]. What precisely are`modal fragments' of classical rst-order logic? Perhaps the most in uential answer is that of Gabbay 25], which identi es them with so-called` nite-variable fragments', using only some xed nite number of variables (free or bound). This view-point has been endorsed by many authors (cf. 16]). Our paper presents a critical review of its supporting evidence, adding some new results about nite-variable fragments, including failures of the Lo s{Tarski preservation theorem. But there is also a second answer to our question, implicit in much of the literature, which emphasizes so-called`bounded quanti cation'. As our positive contribution, we shall develop the latter perspective here, showing its utility as a guide towards generalization of modal notions and techniques to larger fragments of classical logics. In particular, we prove decidability for a large`bounded fragment' of predicate logic, and point out several applications. One can also combine the two views on modal logic, as will be illustrated. Finally, we shall make another move. The above analogy works both ways. Modal operators are like quanti ers, but quanti ers behave like modal operators. This observation inspires a generalized modal semantics for rst-order predicate logic using accessibility constraints on assignments (cf. 45, 47]) which moves the earlier quanti er restrictions into the semantics. This provides a fresh look at the landscape of possible predicate logics, including candi-685
Modal Logic and Classical Logic
Modal Logic is traditionally concerned with the intensional operators \possibly" and \necessary", whose intuitive correspondence with the standard quanti ers \there exists" and \for all" comes out clearly in the usual Kripke semantics. This observation underlies the well-known translation from modal logic into the rst-order language over possible worlds models 12, 13] . In this way, modal formalisms correspond to fragments of a full rst-order (or sometimes higher-order) language over these models, which are both expressively perspicuous and deductively tractable. In this paper, we shall enquire which features of`modal fragments' are responsible for these attractions. Throughout, we shall concentrate on the basic language of modal propositional logic, which still serves as the`pure paradigm' in a rapidly expanding eld of more expressive modal formalisms 56, 51] . What precisely are`modal fragments' of classical rst-order logic? Perhaps the most in uential answer is that of Gabbay 25] , which identi es them with so-called` nite-variable fragments', using only some xed nite number of variables (free or bound). This view-point has been endorsed by many authors (cf. 16]). Our paper presents a critical review of its supporting evidence, adding some new results about nite-variable fragments, including failures of the Lo s{Tarski preservation theorem. But there is also a second answer to our question, implicit in much of the literature, which emphasizes so-called`bounded quanti cation'. As our positive contribution, we shall develop the latter perspective here, showing its utility as a guide towards generalization of modal notions and techniques to larger fragments of classical logics. In particular, we prove decidability for a large`bounded fragment' of predicate logic, and point out several applications. One can also combine the two views on modal logic, as will be illustrated. Finally, we shall make another move. The above analogy works both ways. Modal operators are like quanti ers, but quanti ers behave like modal operators. This observation inspires a generalized modal semantics for rst-order predicate logic using accessibility constraints on assignments (cf. 45, 47] ) which moves the earlier quanti er restrictions into the semantics. This provides a fresh look at the landscape of possible predicate logics, including candi-686 Back and Forth Between Modal Logic and Classical Logic dates sharing various desirable features with basic modal logic { in particular, its decidability.
This paper is the rst public version of a longer projected document { whose current working version is 7] . Further o -spring of this Amsterdam{Budapest collaboration in the eld of modal logic and universal algebra are 6] and 8]. where y is some fresh variable over worlds in the last two clauses:
Other semantics for the modal language may inspire other forms of translation, but we stick with the standard case here. This embedding into predicate logic gives a number of facts about modal logic for free, namely those universal properties of rst-order togic which are inherited by all its fragments, such as the L owenheim{ Skolem Theorem, or by all its e ective fragments, such as recursive axiomatizability for universal validity. What the embedding does not give is speci cs in the latter case: for that, more detailed analysis is needed (see below). Moreover, typically, we do not get more complex meta-properties for free, that make existential claims. E.g., consider Interpolation. If a modal formula implies another modal formula , then, through the translation, some interpolant must exist in the rst-order language { but there is no guarantee that this interpolant will itself be (equivalent to) a modal formula: we shall have to work for this (see again below).
Invariance for bisimulation
The expressive power of the basic modal language with respect to classical logic is measured precisely by the following Invariance Theorem 12, 14]: Theorem 2.1 A rst-order formula (x) is equivalent to the translation of a modal formula i it is invariant for bisimulation.
Here, a bisimulation is a binary relation between the universes of two models linking only points with the same unary predicates P, and satisfying back and forth conditions with respect to relational R-successors in both directions. (Thus, if x bisimulates y, and Rxz, then z bisimulates some u with Ryu, and vice versa. This is a kind of unbounded Ehrenfeucht Game with restricted choices of objects in each move, which has a natural generalization to the case with whole families of accessibility relations.) Invariance' means that a formula gets the same truth value in any two models at 2. BASIC MODAL LOGIC 687 states connected by a bisimulation. This result subsumes the usual facts in the modal literature about preservation under`generated submodels',`disjoint unions' and`pmorphic images'. Proof. For later reference, we sketch a proof of the Invariance Theorem. First, modal formulas must all be invariant, by a simple induction on their construction. Here, the existential modality is taken care of, precisely, by the two zigzag clauses. Conversely, suppose that = (x) is an invariant rst-order formula. Let mod( ) be the set of all modal consequences of . We prove the following implication: Claim 2.2 mod( ) j = .
From this, by Compactness, is easily seen to be equivalent to some nite conjunction of its modal consequences. The proof of the Claim is as follows. Let M; x be any model for mod( ). Now consider the complete modal theory of x in M together with f g . This set of formulas is nitely satis able, by a simple argument (using the fact that mod( ) holds at M; x). By Compactness, it therefore has some model N; y. Now, take any two !-saturated elementary extensions M + ; x and N + ; y of M; x and N; y, respectively. (These exist, by a simple argument in the style of 21].) Claim 2.3 The relation of modal equivalence between worlds is a bisimulation between the two models M + and N + , which connects x with y.
Here, of course, the key observation lies in the back-and-forth clauses. If some world u in M + is modally equivalent with v in N + , and Rus holds, then the following set of formulas is nitely satis able in N + : fRvtg plus the full modal theory of s in M + . But then, by !-saturation, some world t must exist satisfying all of this in N + : which is the required match. The converse argument is symmetric. Having thus proved the second claim, we return to the rst, and clinch the argument by`diagram chasing'. For a start, N; y j = , and hence N + ; y j = (by elementary extension), whence M + ; x j = (by bisimulation invariance), and so M; x j = (an elementary submodel). This style of argument can be extended in many directions, by modulating the key connection between zigzag clauses and restricted quanti er patterns. A much more elaborate discussion of this result and its generalizations to richer modal languages may be found in 20], 51]. (These also discuss connections with the work by Hennessy & Milner 31] on modal process equivalences.)
Decidability via semantic tableaux
A next pleasant feature of the modal formalism is the existence of a simple semantic tableau method for checking universal validity. Its rules include the usual decomposition principles for Boolean operators on sequents, of which the following are samples. (Here, we take semantic consequence between sets of formulas in the usual appropriate sense, as going from the truth of all premises to that of at least one conclusion.) ; :A ) In modal tableaus, the key rule is that for existential modalities, which are best treated in a bunch, when no further propositional reductions are possible: Modal semantic tableaus are adequate for valid consequence in the minimal modal logic (over the universe of all possible worlds models). Corollary 2.5 Modal universal validity is decidable.
The corollary follows since all tableau rules decrease formula complexity of sequents (even though they may temporarily increase the number of parallel tasks). That tableaus are adequate for validity hinges on the semantic validity of the above 3-Rule. Let P; Q be disjoint sequences of proposition letters. Then we have the following refuting the top sequent. We shall return to this`quanti er decomposition' in Section 4, extending these ideas to larger`loose' decidable fragments of predicate logic. These are needed to get the exact correspondence with closed semantic tableaus right. Note that the other main classical structural rule of Contraction is redundant for the completeness proof. (It deduces ; A ) from ; A; A ) .) In classical tableaus or sequent proofs for predicate logic, this rule is needed to ensure that false existential (and true universal) formulas can produce as many substitution instances as are required for the argument. With modal formulas, however, no such unbounded iteration is needed: we did all that is needed in one fell swoop. Thus, our calculus involves no shortening rules, and the proof search space is nite. (In a sense, then, at least as far as quanti cation is concerned,`linear logic' is already complete for modal fragments of predicate logic.)
Proof theory via sequent calculus

Interpolation
The basic modal logic shares several important meta-properties with rst-order predicate logic. One important example is Interpolation: Theorem 2.6 Let j = . Then there exists a modal formula whose proposition letters are included in both and such that j = j = .
We present two proofs here, illustrating the above two perspectives at work. Proof. Proof-theoretic Argument (`Tracing a Sequent Derivation')] By induction on derivations in the above Gentzen sequent calculus. It is convenient to work only with formulas rewritten to the special format (:) atom, &; _; 3; 2; ?; > (Cf. 54], 50] for this technique.) The single axiom case is clear, and one constructs interpolants inductively following the successive rules in a derivation. Proof. Model-theoretic Argument (`Amalgamation via a Bisimulation')] Let L be the joint language of and . Consider the set cons ( ) of all modal consequences of in this language. We prove the following uniform assertion: Claim 2.7 cons ( ) j = . By Compactness, then, some nite conjunction of formulas in cons ( ) implies (and is implied by ). It remains to prove the Claim. Let M; x be any L {model which 690 Back and Forth Between Modal Logic and Classical Logic veri es cons ( ). We must show that M; x j = . First, by a routine argument, the modal L {theory of M; x is nitely satis able together with f g. By Compactness again, there is an L {model N; y j = with the same modal L {theory as M; x.
Next, as in the earlier proof of the Invariance Theorem, we can pass to !-saturated models here, without loss of generality. By that earlier argument, there exists an L {bisimulation between the two models which connects x to y. (Here, the language subscript reminds us that only needs to respect proposition letters which are shared by and .) Now, we construct a new product model MN out of these two bisimulating ones, which will be a kind of`joint unraveling under bisimulation'.
Its worlds are nite sequences of pairs h(x 1 ; y 1 ); : : : ; (x k ; y k )i where always x i y i , and moreover, each world x i+1 must be an R{successor of x i { and likewise for the sequence of worlds y i { for 1 i < k. Now, consider the two natural projections from the nal pairs of such sequences, one going to M and the other to N. Along these, we can lift the valuation for all proposition letters in L ? L from M, and that for L ? L from N. The result is the desired model MN for the joint language L L , whose two projections to M (N) have now become L -(L ) bisimulations. But then, we can argue`clockwise'. First, N; y j = , whence MN, h(x; y)i j = (by bisimulation). Now, since j = , also MN, h(x; y)i j = . But then nally, M; x j = (again by bisimulation). Remark 2.8 This argument was rst stated in correspondence between the authors in 1992. In the meantime, more elaborate versions have appeared independently in 58], 40], clarifying its general categorial background. Remark 2.9 (Modal unraveling and concrete representation) Behind the preceding proof, as well as others to come, lies the well-known observation that each possible worlds model M; x bisimulates with an`unraveled' model consisting of nite sequences of objects (namely, worlds that R-succeed one another), in which the accessibility relation is end extension by one additional element. This may be regarded as a semantic`normal form' in which abstract accessibility has been replaced by a concrete uniform set-theoretic relation. (Marx 40] The atomic diagram of M ; hxi can be satis ed together with . Once this is shown, the usual argument works. From the resulting model N; y, our can be transferred to its submodel (modulo isomorphism) M; x. To prove the claim, consider together with any nite set of (negated) atoms that are true in M ; hxi. The worlds mentioned in the latter can be described as some nite subtree, via branches going down all the way to the root hxi. Now, the resulting branching structure can be described completely via some (inductively constructed) existential modal formula. Moreover, cannot imply the (universal) negation of the latter, given the assumption that M ; hxi j = univ( ). Hence can be satis ed together with this existential description in some model N. By unraveling N once more, this model can be taken to be an intransitive acyclic tree itself. But then, all atomic (negated) facts that were true in the above nite submodel of M ; hxi must also be true here. (No R-steps will be available except those explicitly demanded, which takes care of all negations.) This second proof is close to the standard model-theoretic argument (cf. 21]), specialized to the modal fragment of the rst-order language, more or less`as is'. We shall return to this observation below in a more general setting. Further evidence for this analogy may be found with other model-theoretic preservation theorems, which may be obtained using similar methods. One example is the Lyndon homomorphism theorem for positive formulas (cf. 12]). Here is a sketch for another classical case. Example 2.13 (Preservation under unions of chains) The rst-order formulas that are preserved under unions of chains of models are precisely those that are de nable with a universal-existential ( 2 ) prenex form. In modal logic, the corresponding format must be extended (in the absence of prenex forms), just as above. We only allow formulas constructed from atoms and their negations, using &; _ as well as 3; 2, provided that the former never scopes over the latter. (In intuitionistic logic, this would become the natural class of formulas with implication rank' 2.) The classical argument again starts from a model M in which the univ exist consequences of hold. Then, two models N,K are found such that (1) M is a submodel of N and N of K, (2) M is an elementary submodel of K, (3) holds in N. Iterating this move, a chain of models arises, in whose union holds, which fact can then be transferred to the elementary submodel M. Inspecting the details of this standard argument, while using the above methods, similar triples of models may be constructed for the modal language.
Analyzing the general situation: transfer results
The similarities between modal logic and standard rst-order logic that have come to light so far call for more general explanation. There must be some general feature in the above arguments that can be isolated, and used to explore the full extent of 2. BASIC MODAL LOGIC 693 the analogy. One obvious general point is the pervasive use of bisimulations, which are close to the fundamental notion of`partial isomorphism' =p between rst-order models (`cut o ' at length 2). This observation may be found in 15], and it has inspired a systematic investigation of model theory for basic poly-modal logic in 51], whose results revolve around the`heuristic equation ' Modal Logic: Bisimulation = Predicate Logic: Partial Isomorphism. Another approach is to scrutinize the above arguments, and identify some key lemmas that allow for`transfer' between modal and classical reasoning. One such result is easily extracted from the earlier proof of the Invariance Theorem. Two models M; x and N; y have the same modal theory i they possess elementary extensions which bisimulate. (De Rijke 51] observes that one can choose the latter to be countable ultrapowers.) Here is another result of this kind, which may be of independent interest. It shows how one can`upgrade' modal equivalence to full elementary equivalence, up to bisimulation: Lemma 2.14 Two models M, x and N; y have the same modal theory if and only if they possess bisimulations with two models M + ; x and N + ; y (respectively) which are elementarily equivalent. Proof. From down to up, the assertion is immediate. Consider the downward direction. The required models are constructed using standard Unraveling by nite sequences of the form (x =)x 1 ; x 2 ; : : : ; x k , where each x i+1 is an R-successor of x i (1 i < k), having`immediate succession' for their accessibility relation, and bisimulating with the original model via their last elements. This unravels to the familiar intransitive acyclic trees. In addition, we perform Multiplication, making sure that each node (except the root x) gets copied in nitely many times. This can be done as follows, while maintaining a bisimulation at each stage. First, copy each successor of x at level 1 countably many times, and attach these (disjoint) copies to x. There is an obvious bisimulation here, identifying copies with originals. Next, consider successors at level 2 on all branches of the previous stage, and perform the same copying process at all level{2 worlds. Again, there is an obvious bisimulation with the original model. Iterating this process through all nite levels yields our intended models M + ; x and N + ; y. Proof. The argument uses Ehrenfeucht Games. It su ces to show, for arbitrary nite n, how the Similarity Player can win in any game over n rounds between these structures. What we know at the outset is that the two roots x; y satisfy the same modal formulas. In fact, as we shall prove separately, they even satisfy the same tense-logical formulas. This observation will be used to describe the proper invariant for the Ehrenfeucht game. Assume that in round i of the game, a match has been established already between certain nite groups of worlds in the two models which satis es three conditions: The upshot of all this is a number of`matched islands' on both sides, all lying a distance of more than 2 n?i steps apart. Now, we have to show that this invariant can be maintained in the next step, whatever world the Di erence Player chooses. Let the next choice be some point P in either tree. Case 1 P has distance 2 N?i?1 to some point Q that was already matched at the previous stage, say to some point Q 0 . Consider the (unique) path of length k (say) between P and Q, and attach complete tense-logical descriptions to its nodes up to operator depth 2 N?i?1 . This path may then be described, from the perspective of Q, by a tense-logical formula of the form
where k is the full 2 N?i?1 {description in tense logic of the point P.
The total operator depth of this formula is at most 2 N?i?1 (being the length of the path) + 2 N?i?1 (the quality of the descriptions at its nodes), which is at most 2 N?i . Now, at the previous stage i, Q and Q 0 agreed on tense-logical formulas up to the latter depth. Hence this path description is also true at Q 0 , and we can nd corresponding worlds on the other side, making the two paths isomorphic as required by our invariant, while also achieving the right degree of tense-logical equivalence.
Case 2 P lies at distance > 2 N?i?1 from all previously matched points. In this case, take the unique path from the root to P. Describe that path completely as before, with node descriptions up to level 2 N?i?1 . The resulting tense-logical formula may be of high complexity (since there is no bound on the path length), but since the two roots agree on all tense-logical formulas, there must be a similar path on the other side, whose end-point is an appropriate match for P. Moreover, this path can be chosen so as to remain at a suitable distance from all nodes in already matched regions, because of the Multiplication of nodes (this is the only point where we use this feature). Thus, in this case too, the above invariant is maintained.
Finally, after n rounds, this invariant will lead to a partial isomorphism, which is a win for the Similarity Player. (To get a concrete feel for the strategy, compare two modally equivalent trees where one has an in nite branch and the other does not. This example also shows that we cannot improve our Lemma to the existence of a bisimulation between the unraveled multiplied models.) To wrap things up, it remains to prove the announced 2. BASIC MODAL LOGIC 695 Sublemma 2.16 If the roots of two unraveled modal models have the same modal theory, then they also have the same tense-logical theory (in the language extended with a modal operator for \past"). Proof. It su ces to observe a number of tense-logical validities on trees like this. First:
As a result, using some standard modal manipulations, every formula is equivalent to one without future operators scoping over past ones. This just leaves compounds of pure future' (i.e., modal) formulas combined using : , & and PAST. The latter can still be simpli ed using two more valid equivalences:
As a result, every formula is equivalent to a Boolean combination of formulas PAST i (with i repetitions) where is purely modal. But then, the roots must agree on all tense-logical formulas. They already agreed on all modal formulas, and they will both reject any PAST formula (lacking predecessors).
Using similar techniques of modal unraveling plus Ehrenfeucht Games, one can also show a related transfer result. Two models M; x and N; y bisimulate if and only if their multiplied unraveled versions are partially isomorphic.
Analyzing the general situation: predictions
Finally, as to the full extent of the analogies between modal logic and classical logic, let us risk a bold generalization. The set of all predicate-logical formulas may be viewed as the domain of a (`meta-')model which carries some natural structure. For instance, meta-theorems like Interpolation are themselves ( 2 ) rst-order statements about this model, in the following similarity type: one binary relation of \semantic consequence", and another binary relation of \vocabulary inclusion". (A closely related meta-model has been investigated in 41]. The complete rst-order meta-theory of propositional logic turned out to be e ectively equivalent to True Arithmetic { thereby saving the logical profession from rapid extinction.) Similar observations can be made concerning other preservation theorems. For instance, the Lo s{Tarski Theorem can be restated as an equivalence between (1) j = ( ) A (i.e., implies its own relativization to some new unary predicate A) and (2) the existence of some universal formula equivalent to . Both assertions involve some slight expansion of the above meta-model to include further predicates encoding`elementary syntax' into the similarity type. Thus formulated, the Lo s{Tarski theorem becomes a simple 2 {sentence, too. Now, note that the modal fragment is a submodel of at least the rst of these predicate-logical meta-models, in an obvious way. (With the second one, we have to be more careful, as the result needs to be restated due to the lack of modal prenex forms { though not of modal relativizations.) In this perspective, here is a guess which would explain why one always seems able to`witness' existential quanti ers over formulas inside the modal fragment: 696 Back and Forth Between Modal Logic and Classical Logic Conjecture 2.17 The modal fragment is an elementary submodel of full predicate logic in the rst similarity type given above.
With results like this, one could decide transfer of meta-theorems between rstorder logic and modal logic by merely inspecting their form.
Poly-modal generalizations
One test for the naturalness of the above results for the basic modal language is how they survive generalization. At least, things work very smoothly for the practically important case of poly-modal languages with families of unary modalities 3 i (i 2 I), each with their corresponding accessibility relation R i . One can virtually literally transcribe the above theory, putting in appropriate indices. Nevertheless, subtleties do arise occasionally. For instance, in the Interpolation Theorem, one can now also talk about the shared modalities of the two original formulas, and an interpolant should contain only these. But then, the above proof is incorrect as it stands. For, the amalgamation de ned in Section 2.5 only yields bisimulating projections for (relations corresponding to) the shared modalities. In order to make the amalgamation bisimulate with the two separate models in their full language (as is required by the nal argument), one has to add copies to the amalgam MN of those parts of M and N that branch o via non-shared successor relations, and extend the projection via the identity map on the new parts (cf. 19]). This is not a serious departure from the basic modal case, but it is not totally trivial either.
Next, we consider a more serious generalization, namely to polyadic modalities.
Here, one needs (k +1){ary accessibility relations for each k{ary existential modality: 697 Even though there is no change in principle here, practical complexity may increase in this proof system. For instance, the introduction rule for a binary existential modality that emerges from the tableau calculus will now read as follows: & f1;:::;kg X ( `f i j i 2 Xg or `f 1 ; : : : ; k g ? f i j i 2 Xg) 3 `3 1 1 ; : : : ; 3 k k 4 Craig Interpolation holds, and it may still be proved constructively using the sequent proof calculus, as well as model-theoretically. 5 The Lo s{Tarski Preservation Theorem holds, by essentially the earlier argument with bisimulation invariance and copying. This requires a notion of`unraveling' via suitable nite sequences for many relations at the same time. The latter is again one of the cases where some care is needed in formulation of results. For instance, in unraveling a triple Rabc, one has to keep track of the whole ternary con guration, indicating that the step from a to b went via the triple (abc), in order to distinguish this from a possible other situation Ra; bd. There are several notational solutions to problems like this, which we do not elaborate here.
3 Finite variable fragments
The nite variable hierarchy
Finite-variable fragments of rst-order logic were introduced for technical reasons in 28]. These consist of all formulas using only some xed nite set of variables (free or bound): say fxg, fx; yg, fx; y; zg, etcetera { but otherwise allowing arbitrary combinations of quanti ers and connectives. An important connection with modal logic was pointed out in 25]. Finite operator sets generate modal languages whose transcriptions involve only some xed nite number of variables (free and bound). For instance, the basic modal language can make do with two world variables only (as may be seen by further analysis of the earlier translation, judiciously`recycling' just x; y), while, e.g., the well-known temporal language with`Since' and`Until' uses essentially three variables. Thus, there is a Finite Variable Hierarchy:
inside whose levels one nds modal logics of ascending expressive strength. This is a natural division. Like the basic modal language itself, these successive levels can be characterized via a semantic invariance property 15, 16] . To state the result, we follow the usual convention that (x 1 ; : : : ; x k ) denotes a formula whose free variables are all among fx 1 ; : : : ; x k g. Moreover, by k-variable formulas we shall mean rst-order formulas all of whose variables (whether free or bound) are among fx 1 ; : : : ; x k g. The crucial step in the induction is the quanti er case. Quanti ed variables are irrelevant to the assignment, so that the relevant partial isomorphism can be restricted to size at most k ? 1, whence a matching choice for the witness can be made on the opposite side. This proves \only if". Next, \if" has a proof analogous to that of the Invariance Theorem (cf. Section 2.2). One shows that an invariant formula (x 1 ; : : : ; x k ) must be implied by the set of all its k-variable consequences. The key step in this argument goes as before. We nd two models which are elementarily equivalent for all k-variable formulas. These then possess !{saturated elementary extensions { for which the relation of k-elementary equivalence itself de nes a family of partial isomorphisms between tuples of objects up to length k, which satis es all the above requirements for k-partial isomorphism.
The case for
In addition to the preceding natural semantic characterization, several arguments plead in favour of the preceding fragmentation of rst-order logic. Our contribution to this discussion will be both critical and constructive. First, we notice one more failure. The Lo s{Tarski Theorem fails for most nite-variable fragments, who therefore lose much of the meta-theory of full rst-order logic. On the other hand, we do prove a natural modi ed version of the theorem, replacing submodels by a more general (and absolute) notion of 'partial embeddings'. Finally, we note that the theorem may also be reinstated by withdrawing to`restricted quanti er fragments' (cf. Section 4.3 below), or by providing nite-variable fragments with a suitable kind of`generalized semantics' (cf. Section 5 below). The latter move also provides a good proof theory, as well as interpolation and de nability theorems (cf. 44, 47, 8, 40] ).
Failure of the Submodel Preservation Theorem
The are di erent, and hence, x 0 must be equal to one of them. The only option here is x 0 = x, since Rx 0 yz; :Rx 00 yz rules out x 0 = x 00 . Claim 3.4 is in the 3-variable fragment.
Proof. By some straightforward syntactic manipulation. Proof. By direct inspection. In both cases, there are exactly two objects in . Note how the parity in the de nition of Z ensures that there will be another object in which does not have the same`tail'. The problem with U is that too many tails are allowed.
Now, the counter-example is complete once we prove our nal For further information, we refer to 8], which presents a more elaborate version of the above argument, that extends to rst-order languages without equality. Moreover, related ideas are used in 6] to construct uniform failures of Interpolation in nitevariable fragments.
Modi ed preservation theorems
The above negative argument contains the core of a positive result. (For convenience, we shift to a dual existential formulation here.) What can still be proved is a Lo s{ Tarski Theorem for k-variable fragments characterizing their appropriate syntactic notion of`k{existential de nability' (in terms of atoms and their negations, &; _ and 9) via preservation under so-called`k-partial embeddings', being restriction-closed non-empty families of k-partial isomorphisms which satisfy the Forth-condition only. In proving the \Forth" clause here, one has nite approximations of the new element by means of k{existential formulas, and then nds a simultaneous witness via Saturation. In particular, our embedding sends the sequence of B{values on our k variables to the corresponding A-values, whence must hold in M; A, too.
Partial embedding' stands to`submodel' as`partial isomorphism' stands to`isomorphism'. That is, it is the closest`absolute' notion, in the sense of Abstract Model Theory. Similar nite-variable modi cations exist for other classical model-theoretic results.
Failure of the Interpolation Theorem
Other classical key properties may fail, too. Here is a simple argument to this e ect. Theorem 3.8 Craig Interpolation fails in all k{variable fragments (k 2). Proof. Consider any k{variable fragment L k , and take k unary predicates A 1 ,: : :,A k . Let the rst-order formula k say that (i) each A i holds for one object (this needs two variables), (ii) all A i are disjoint (this needs one variable) and (iii) every object satis es at least one A i (again, one variable). Note that k holds only in domains of size k. In a similar way, one constructs a formula k+1 , using new unary predicates B 1 ; : : : ; B k+1 , true only in domains of size k + 1. Clearly k j = : k+1 , with both formulas from L k . By Interpolation, there should be a k{variable formula containing only identity with k j = j = : k+1 . But this is a contradiction. For, pure identity formulas using only k variables cannot make a diference between domains with k and with k + 1 objects.
The counter-example generalizes to rst-order languages without identity, by replacing = with a suitable equivalence relation.
Conclusion
Finite-variable fragments, though attractive, do not explain all there is to Modal Logic. Hence, we now turn to an alternative analysis, whose focus is restriction of 4. BOUNDED QUANTIFIER FRAGMENTS 703 quanti ers. This alternative is not exclusive. The nite variable hierarchy can be superimposed on it { and then, it will regain the positive properties that were shown to fail above. 4 Bounded quanti er fragments
The basic restriction schema
Evidently, the basic modal fragment is only a subset of the full two-variable fragment, since its syntax satis es additional constraints. In particular, all quanti ers in translations of modal formulas occur`restricted', in the forms 9y (Rxy & (y)); 8y (Rxy ! (y)):
Semantically, the latter form correlates with the earlier de nition of bisimulation, explaining its particular zigzag clauses. This observation suggests another classi cation. What we are dealing with are quanti er restrictions, which may be varied along various dimensions. The general schema here is as follows: 9y(Ry; x & (x; y; z)) where x,y,z are nite sequences of variables:
And the question is how much can be allowed as to variable occurrences without losing the attractive features of the basic modal logic, in particular, its decidability. We shall take this perspective as our point of departure in a hierarchy of`restricted' or bounded' fragments of predicate logic. Some initial stages already occurred in Section 2.9 above. As for the attraction of this schema, restricted formulas play a crucial role in absoluteness in Set Theory (being called` 0 {formulas'). The precise point of the latter analogy for modal logic remains to be understood (cf. 18] for some connections). Let us now be a bit more precise. Our fragments are de ned inside a rst-order predicate language. We start with arbitrary atoms, and allow further constructions with Boolean operators as well as the above restricted quanti er schemata (where the R can be any relation symbol). Many variations are possible here without a ecting our main results. Here are some. (i) The y{arguments can occur at any place in Ry; x, (ii) Boolean compounds of restrictions, such as`Rxy 1 & Rxy 2 ', may be allowed in special cases (but we shall see below that this is not always admissible), (iii) some restricting relations might be forbidden to occur elsewhere as atoms, and (iv) moving slightly, though not essentially, beyond standard rst-order logic:] restricting predicates R may be allowed variable nite arity for their x{ and y{arguments. More problematic seems the addition of an identity predicate. Nevertheless, in the full version 7], we extend our decidability results to the latter case as well. Note that the original basic modal fragment coincides with our Fragment 1 where we have only one special binary restricting relation symbol (that can occur in restrictions only). These fragments may be understood in various ways. Model-theoretically, it is easy to extend the earlier notion of modal bisimulation to describe them (cf. Section 4.4 below), which can be used to see that we have a genuine upward hierarchy of expressive strength. But for the moment, we choose another, more combinatorial approach, which focuses on their`looseness' and decidability (cf. Section 2.3 above). Fragment 1 is decidable, being still close to modal logic. Also, it is not too hard to see that Fragment 3 is undecidable. Our main result in this Section is that the rather powerful Fragment 2 is decidable. As we shall show, this theorem generalizes several existing results from the modal and algebraic literature.
Decomposition of universal validity
One way of understanding the nature of restricted fragments is by extension of the earlier semantic tableau analysis. The crucial point there was to nd some decomposition rule for validity of a sequent involving only existential quantifers (plus perhaps atoms) on both sides. As a warming-up, here are two useful decomposition properties for the original modal fragment. The rst is an earlier observation: This fact depended on bisimulation invariance for this language. In fact, we only need invariance of these formulas for the generated submodels in the rooting construction. (The latter notion admits a larger class of predicate-logical formulas as invariants.) There is another convenient reduction for modal formulas involving di erent`current worlds' (cf. 37] for this generalization inside modal logic itself): This may be proved like Fact 4.1, but now, by mere disjoint union of counter-examples to the lower sequents. Thus, Fact 4.2 holds for all rst-order formulas that are invariant for disjoint unions (van Benthem 14] has a preservation theorem de ning them). These points will return below, as our modal arguments can be generalized to rst-order logic.
Fragment 1 is decidable
We start with a simple warm-up case, which is still very close to basic modal logic. Theorem 4.3 Validity of formulas in Fragment 1 is decidable.
Proof. (Outline) First, we perform all possible propositional reductions in a sequent, so that only atoms and existential quanti ers remain on both sides. Then we prove 4. BOUNDED QUANTIFIER FRAGMENTS 705 a reduction to matrix formulas like above. The point is to glue together counterexamples for sequents below where the quanti ers have been stripped o , so as to refute the original sequent with quanti ers. The presence of longer sequent arguments x, y does not make an essential di erence to this construction. And neither does the presence of arbitrary arguments y in the matrix formula (rather than the`separated conjunctions' employed in polyadic modal logic), provided that the former have the required invariance property. Indeed, even when starting with`mixed' initial formulas 9y ( has some xed nite arity for its y-arguments.) After this rst argument, we shall present a second modi ed reduction strategy which deals with the whole of Fragment 2, including arbitrary occurrences of R{atoms. First Reduction Strategy For a start, we note a useful normal form. Without loss of generality, we may assume that no atom occurs on both sides, and that each`parameter group' x occurs on both sides. (The latter can always be achieved by inserting`inert' formulas with a constant`true' or`false' matrix for these parameters). Note that there can be more than one formula to the left (or right) for each parameter group. (1) This construction depends crucially on the independence of the successor sets R x], even for parameter groups x that may be structurally related (say, as subsequences). Imposing structural constraints on the relation R may a ect our results.
For instance, one can easily allow permutation or contraction of x-parameters (cf. 1]), but it is less clear what happens when some form of (generalized) transitivity is imposed. (Here, the modal analogy with the logic K4 would still suggest decidability, though.) (2) These reductions may also be used to measure complexity of decidability.
Next, we inoindent Second Reduction Strategy Next, we introduce another semantic method, which yields the desired result for our full fragment { without the earlier syntactic proviso on restricting atoms R. Theorem 4.11 Universal validity for formulas in Fragment 2 is decidable.
The proof is based on the mosaic method in 45, 47] or in 7].
Proof. The proof can be obtained from the one in 47] by adapting it to the present case, cf. 7].
It remains an open problem whether Fragment 2 has the nite model property. This is strongly related to the open problem posed e.g. in 45, 47, 40] asking whether the class Crs of cylindric-relativized set algebras of -ary relations has the nite model property (for > 2). The same applies to the decidable version of rst order logic introduced in 47]. Applications will come below. We end with a negative result about our third fragment.
Fragment 3 is Undecidable
The general parametrized quanti er restriction schema 9y (Rx; y & (x; y; z)) becomes as powerful as predicate logic itself. Fact 4.12 Predicate-logical satis ability is e ectively reducible to satis ability in the parametrized restriction language. Proof. The relevant reduction takes any predicate-logical sentence to its relativization ( ) to some unary predicate U not occurring in . ( ) lies inside the parametrized restriction language. It is easy to see that is satis able if and only if ( ) is.
Meta-properties of bounded fragments
Other modal techniques from earlier sections may also be generalized to these fragments. We will merely formulate a short list of results obtained along the above lines. Table also suggests further issues. In Section 3 above, we saw that the nite variable hierarchy does not behave as well with respect to rst-order logic as its modal counterpart. But this behaviour may improve when a nite-variable hierarchy is super-imposed on restricted quanti er fragments. In particular, we have proofs for complete nite axiomatizability, Craig Interpolation and Lo s{Tarski for all k{variable levels of Fragment 2. By contrast, one can obtain negative solutions to the above open questions for all nite{variable levels of Fragment 3. This may be proved by suitably relativized versions of earlier results. Example 4.13 (Failure of Submodel Preservation in F3.3) Consider the counter-example to the Submodel Preservation Theorem from Section 3. Its relativization U to some new unary predicate U is in Fragment 3. It is easy to 4. BOUNDED QUANTIFIER FRAGMENTS 709 see that U , too, is preserved under submodels. Now, suppose that it had a universal equivalent in the three-variable fragment of Fragment 3. This cannot happen, because we can now compare the two models constructed in the proof of Claim 4 in Section 3.4, both having U as the universal predicate. There is a 3{simulation from one to the other, which refutes the adequacy of just as before.
Bounded fragments and bisimulation
The above fragments may be analyzed in terms of modal bisimulations. For this purpose, one can x the earlier Invariance Theorem as a target result, and use its model-theoretic proof as a heuristic device for generating the appropriate notions of semantic simulation. We omit technical details here. Here are the outcomes for this style of analysis: in all cases, bisimulations will be binary relations between tuples of objects in the two models being compared (the modal fragment made do with single objects) all matches between tuples correspond to partial isomorphisms in general, bisimulations must be closed under restrictions, in the obvious way the back and forth conditions re ect the existential quanti er patterns of the fragments in a straightforward fashion (we display one side only):
Assume that two tuples a and b are already matched, then we must require The crucial test, in each case, is that, in the earlier proof of the Invariance Theorem, elementary equivalence in the relevant fragment between tuples of objects de nes a bisimulation of the appropriate kind, at least between !-saturated models. The outcome of this analysis is a sequence of Preservation Theorems, characterizing Fragments 1, 2, 3 as consisting of precisely those rst-order formulas (up to logical equivalence) which are invariant for these three types of bisimulation. Here is an application of this analysis. composition and choice), while others lead outside of them (e.g., predicate intersection and complement, which violate`bisimulation invariance': cf. 17]). Such more expressive fragments, too, can be analyzed via our previous techniques.
The preceding results can all be specialized to Finite-Variable fragments of Bounded fragments. For instance, it may be of interest to consider`joint simulations' combining the restrictions of Sections 4 and 3. Even so, the two hierarchies seem largely orthogonal.
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5 Generalized rst-order semantics
A modal view of Tarski semantics
In our discussion so far, the main impact of modal techniques on standard logic has been the identi cation of rst-order fragments that behave well over standard Tarski models. But one can also turn the tables, and interpret the full language of rst-order predicate logic over generalized rst-order models { where assignments (or objects) may only be`available' subject to certain constraints (again, regulated by certain accessibility relations R), retaining the core of Tarski's truth de nition. This proposal originates in algebraic logic (cf. 43, 46, 47] on relativizations of representable algebras of logics, with applications to the eld of logic itself). This approach has been pursued since with modal techniques as well (cf. 56, 40, 19] ). This second research program is not the subject of the present paper, but it is closely related in motivation and content. Here is a brief sketch of its main features and outcomes.
Modal rst-order models are triples of the form M = (S; fR x g x2VAR ; I) where S is a set of`states', R x a binary relation between states for each variable x, and I is aǹ interpretation function' giving a truth value to all atomic formulas Px; Rxy; Ryx; : : : in each state . This abstract modal format turns out to be all that is needed to set up the standard inductive truth de nition for rst-order logic:
M; a j = Px i I( ; Px)
Boolean connectives as usual M; a j = 9x i for some : R x and M; j = : Thus, predicate logic becomes a poly-modal logic with 9x as an existential modality.
In this full generality, models may deviate considerably from the standard paradigm. Dependence cannot be modeled in standard Tarskian semantics, which modi es values for variables completely arbitrarily. Finally, to get an even closer approximation to the standard rst-order language, one must introduce substitutions in the models (see below).
There is a growing literature on this generalized semantics. In particular, modal rst-order models validate a`minimal predicate logic', which is really just the minimal poly-modal logic, with all the positive properties studied in this paper (including decidability). On top of that lies a landscape of further calculi, all the way up to full predicate logic: which now becomes the particular (undecidable) mathematical theory of full function-space assignment models. The modal logic of the above generalized assignment models is an interesting intermediate possibility (called`cylindricrelativized-set algebras' in the algebraic literature), which is decidable and has positive meta-properties ( Lo s{Tarski, Craig Interpolation). Natural extensions arise by imposing constraints on the admissible assignments, such as`local squareness' or thè patchwork property' (cf. 47]). Many results on completeness, correspondence and interpolation for modal rst-order logics in this sub-classical landscape, as well as representation theorems for its abstract models, may be found in 47] and other papers cited above. (Cf. also 19, 40] .) One novel feature of this approach is that the generalized semantics invites the introduction of new vocabulary, re ecting distinctions not usually found in rst-order logic. Examples are irreducibly polyadic quanti ers 9y binding tuples of variables y, or modal calculi of substitutions (cf. 39, 10, 48, 57] ). Illustration 5.1 For each variable x, we already have an accessibility relation R x in modal rst-order models, corresponding to`random assignment'. Next, we can also introduce`determinate assignment' mirroring the syntactic operation of substitution. Here is a way of doing this. For each pair of variables x; y, introduce a new unary modality S xy with the intended meaning that, for each formula of predicate logic, S xy is equivalent to the formula y=x] in which all free occurrences of x have been replaced by y in the usual way. That is, S xy is equivalent with 9x (x = y & ). Now, modal rst-order models will carry extra accessibility relations A x;y , that can be subjected 
Back-and-forth between modal logic and predicate logic
Comparing the main thrust of this paper and the program outlined in Section 5.1, two main approaches emerge towards`taming' classical rst-order logic: i.e., localizing what may be called a well-behaved decidable`core part'. One can either use standard semantics over non-standard language fragments, or use non-standard generalized semantics over the full standard rst-order language. The former approach is more`syntactical' in nature, the latter more`semantical'. (Eventually, as so often in logic, this distinction is relative. For instance, one can also translate`semantic' modal discourse about the above modal rst-order models into a restricted syntactic fragment of a two-sorted rst-order logic, with direct reference to both`individuals' and`states'. But also conversely,... etcetera.) More speci cally, evident technical analogies exist between existing proof methods for generalized semantics in the sense of Section 5.1 and those of the present paper. We feel that there is a mathematical duality lurking in the background here, largely unexplored { which we illustrate by some simple observations. In particular, our earlier analysis of bounded rst-order 5. GENERALIZED FIRST-ORDER SEMANTICS 713 fragments may be used to derive results about generalized assignment semantics, or equivalently, about relativized cylindric algebras (i.e., Crs-models). From bounded fragments to cylindric algebra Consider any k{variable language Lfx 1 ; : : : ; x k g. Let R be some new k{ary predicate. We de ne a translation tr g from k{variable formulas to restricted rstorder formulas:
Global Relativization tr g ( ) arises from by relativization of all its quanti ers to the same atom Rx 1 : : : x k Note that the relativized images tr g ( ) will even lie inside our bounded Fragment 2. Next, we de ne a corresponding operation on models. Let M be any generalized assignment model for Lfx 1 ; : : : ; x k g (as yet without the new predicate symbol R). The purpose of this construction shows in the following fact. Then, there exists a satisfying k{tuple of objects in R for tr g ( ), which corresponds to an available assignment in M which is an i{variant of . I.e., M; j = 9x i .
As a consequence, one can e ectively reduce universal validity over all generalized assignment models (i.e., in Crs) to standard validity in Fragment 2. This result provides a new`modal' proof for the following theorem, in a rst{order language without identity so far (cf. 47]). Theorem 5.4 Validity in Crs is decidable.
Proof. This follows from the corresponding results for Fragment 2. Remark 5.5 (Uniform translation) The above translation can be made to work for the whole rst-order language at once, using a slightly more complex model construction. (The idea is to assign one additional`dummy object' to all but nitely many variables in our`available assignments'.
There is more to the above analysis, however. Special classes of generalized assignment models have arisen by imposing more speci c constraints on admissible assignments. Now, the rst-order theory of such classes, too, will be decidable, as long as their additional conditions can be stated in rst-order forms translatable into Fragment 2. Checking some examples found in 47], we see that this analysis applies to`D ' or`G ' . In particular, we have a new proof for the following result. Theorem 5.6 Universal validity is decidable on the class of generalized assignment models which are locally square. Proof. The reason is that the requirements for being locally square are all expressible inside Fragment 2. Here is an example of the relevant kind of formula:
By contrast, we know that validity is undecidable in the class of generalized assignment models satisfying the Patchwork Property. Again, this checks out. In rst-order form, the latter constraint involves statements like
Note that these are not in Fragment 2: variable inclusion holds from matrix to restriction, but the latter is not one single atom. (This shows that we cannot allow arbitrary Boolean combinations of restrictions in our earlier results.) This style of analysis is quite powerful, and it can be used to predict decidability of many other combinations of algebraic axioms on top of Crs, as long as their complete frame properties fall inside Fragment 2.
We conclude with a natural converse question. Can one also derive the behaviour of our modal bounded fragments from algebraic results about generalized assignment models? In particular, is there a converse reduction going from standard validity of formulas in Fragment 2 to generalized validity of suitable formulas red( ) over generalized assignment models? At least, the identical translation does not work here. The following Fragment 2 formula is valid, but it is not in Crs:
We do have some partial converse results, that work for suitably 'uniformly relativized' formulas in Fragment 2 { but we shall leave this matter open here. Remark 5.7 (Dependency semantics) The preceding analysis also suggests a comparison between generalized assignment models and the`dependency models' for generalized quanti ers Qx proposed in 5. GENERALIZED FIRST-ORDER SEMANTICS 715 38, 2] . These quanti ers are read there as stating the existence of some object depending' on the range of the assignment so far. The two semantics are evidently related in spirit, but still they are not quite isomorphic. For instance, generalized assignment semantics validates unrestricted Monotonicity for the existential quanti er Nevertheless, all our general results apply { since tr l , like tr g , takes rst-order formulas to formulas in Fragment 2. Therefore, we can derive the decidability result of Alechina 1] , and also, we can predict decidability for all stronger dependency logics having their characteristic frame conditions inside Fragment 2 (cf. 3]). Bisimulation and Ehrenfeucht games Next, consider basic notions of equivalence between models in the respective domains. As was pointed out in 15, 51] , bisimulation stands to modal logic as Ehrenfeucht games (or rather,`partial isomorphism') to standard rst-order logic. As before, comparisons in the present setting are promising but somewhat inconclusive. For instance, a modal bisimulation between generalized assignment models which relates assignments ; only if they have the same domain, induces an obvious relation PI between (those tuples of objects that form) the ranges of and . PI is a family of partial isomorphisms. It will satisfy the usual backand-forth extension conditions for`partial isomorphism' i our generalized rst-order model satis es the following Update Postulate:`For any object, any assignment has an extension which assigns that object to some fresh variable'. Then, the bisimulation clause for the latter variable will do the job. Conversely, given a partial isomorphism PI between two models, we can de ne a modal bisimulation between partial assignments over them by checking whether their ranges are a matching pair of object tuples in PI. But perhaps, the more interesting comparison lies in the di erences. Generalized assignment models suggest a change in the standard model-theoretic notion of partial isomorphism, using a ner-grained connection between partial assignments (rather than at sequences of objects) in the two models involved.
Thus, the mathematical analogies between generalized assignment models in Cylindric Algebra and possible worlds semantics for Modal Logic have proved of evident bene t.
Further directions
At various places so far, we indicated open research questions. These concerned both technical elaboration within our framework (details of Lo s{Tarski theorems in Section 3, meta-properties of further rst-order fragments: cf. Section 4) and extensions to a broader environment (e.g., mathematical connections with generalized assignment or dependency semantics: cf. Section 5). In this last Section, we brie y mention some further directions.
Special frame constraints
Basic modal logic is usually enriched with special frame conditions, as with S4, S5 or more complex systems, imposing transitivity or other natural frame conditions. How do these additional conditions systematically a ect the above picture? (Note, e.g., that the generalized Tarski Semantics of section 5 employs, at least, S5-like frame conditions.) What we also need to understand here is the possibility of a systematic trade-o ' between`packages' of rst-order translations plus frame constraints. For instance, S5 can also be translated faithfully without any frame constraints by dropping the accessibility restriction on quanti ers. And more subtle examples of this phenomenon exist as well. (Cf. the modelling for the modal logic B of all symmetric frames in 13].) To complicate the picture even further, other rst-order translations may be studied from this perspective, too, such as the`path formulas' of 49].
In nitary extensions
'Restriction' works just as well in fragments of higher-order languages, such as L !1! or L 1! or second-order logic. We can transfer our`modal hierarchy' up to here: with arbitrary set conjunctions and disjunctions ( 20] Rijke 51] , which allow both modest additions (such as the 'di erence modality') and strong extensions in expressive power (such as temporal logics of`since' and`until'). It would be of interest to extend our analysis in this direction. This would also t in with the move towards introducing richer vocabularies in generalized assignment semantics, mentioned in Section 5. The important point to note here is that our strategy of`fragments' by no means implies logical poverty.
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Alternative semantics
There are still further alternatives in modelling rst-order predicate logic which may be relevant to our present concerns. For instance, starting from a more computational motivation in 'dynamic semantics', Hollenberg & Vermeulen 1994 propose a stackbased account of rst-order logic which makes the latter's two-variable fragment as powerful as the whole language. (In essence, this says that two variables over nite sequences are as good as arbitrary nite numbers of variables over individual objects.) It remains to be seen how our considerations fare in such sequence semantics.
